Ben Morgan – Russia’s time just ran out

The big news this week is that the $ 60 billion US aid package for Ukraine passed Congress. It will be signed into law by President Biden later this week.  After considerable debate the bill was put forward by Republican Speaker Mike Johnson, against strong opposition from right wing members of his own party.  Johnson’s decision means he will face considerable political and personal attacks from members of his own party, and could lose his position.  But his moral courage is an example to politicians everywhere, that sometimes being on the right side of history requires bravery and that fear should not influence their decisions.

This aid package will not win the war, but it will provide Ukraine with breathing space to develop its new strategy. Since the beginning of the year, Russia has been on the offensive. It captured Avdiivka and is demonstrating a range of new tactical capabilities.  Improvements integrated with its strategic operations.  For instance, the air campaign attacking power infrastructure forces Ukraine to keep some of its air defence missiles away from the frontline. Or, Russia’s information operations that spread disinformation. projecting an image of Russian dominance in mainstream and social media to influence political decision-making around the world.

However, in these columns we have argued that Russia’s real test is battlefield success, that the land campaign is the metric by which success is measured. That rather than news reports telling us Ukraine is collapsing, Russia needs to demonstrate its dominance by ‘moving the line.’ But another week has passed without a Russian success.  And now time is running out for Putin’s men.

The land campaign, Ukraine has not collapsed and won’t

Last week, we identified Chasiv Yar was Russia’s main effort.  A prediction that Ukraine’s intelligence services also made later in the week. Ukraine’s confirmation of our assessment reinforces the theory that Chasiv Yar and the Ukrainian salient demarcated by Lyman, Bakhmut and Avdiivka are the key areas to watch. 

Chasiv Yar sits on an important road junction and the village’s potential to control local road networks makes it useful for an advance east towards Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, Russia’s most likely summer objective. Currently, the indicator that we are most interested in is a sudden and unexpected movement in this area, for instance a Ukrainian withdrawal from Chasiv Yar.  Experience in Bakhmut and Avdiivka indicates that a battle for this village could take months. So, if Chasiv Yar is captured  sooner it indicates that Russia’s new level of tactical competence is translating into tactical victories. 

But as this article is being written Chasiv Yar remains in Ukrainian hands, although Russian forces are attempting to envelop it from the north and south. 

An indication of the importance of this village to Russia is the deployment of elite airborne units (VDV) into the battle including elements of 331st VDV Regiment and 11th VDV Brigade (the term ‘brigade’ or a ‘regiment’ describes roughly the same size unit of about 2,000 soldiers and a couple of hundred armoured fighting vehicles, in Russian military nomenclature a ‘brigade’ is an independent unit that can be deployed anywhere while a ‘regiment’ is part of a division and will normally operate within this larger formation). The VDV are Russia’s best infantry soldiers and have spearheaded offensive operations throughout the conflict.  So, their deployment near Chasiv Yar is evidence that this village is developing into Russian main effort.

However, this does not mean Russian forces are not active in other places because they continue to conduct attacks right along the frontline, especially on the Kremina-Svatove Line but are not making significant gains. 

On 19 April, the Institute for the Study of War quoted Kostyantyn Mashovets, a well-respected Ukrainian observer who reported that “elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces are attempting to push Ukrainian forces out of Bilohorivka (south of Kreminna) in order to break through to the area near Zvanivka (southwest of Siversk) and set conditions for future Russian offensive operations towards Siversk.”  Mashovets’s report also claims that elements of three VDV regiments the 51st, 119th, and 137th are operating in this area, their commitment indicating that this is another priority axis for the Russians.  

Mashovets statement and other reporting is consistent with this column’s assessment of Russian planning, that the aim this summer will be to create the conditions for an attack on Sloviansk and Kramatorsk by taking Chaisv Yar and reducing the Ukrainian salient demarcated by Lyman, Bakhmut and Avdiivka. Mashovets and other commentators have reported significant Russian losses of armoured vehicles.  This is likely to be a result of two factors; Russia increasing the size of its attacking formations and that Ukraine retains significant defensive firepower.  

How the land campaign is likely to develop

Last week, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Kharkiv is an objective for Russia this summer.  Prior to Lavrov’s statement my assessment was that this summer will develop roughly as follows:

Ukraine will continue to hold the current frontline for as long as possible while a stronger defensive line is developed a safe distance behind the frontline.

Russia’s operational level objective is to establish conditions for attacking Sloviansk and Kramatorsk (circled in red on the map below). Donbas’s last two large cities remaining in Ukrainian control. 

This summer Russia will concentrate on creating the conditions to achieve the objective later this year, or in 2025. Specifically, capturing the road network required to supply a force large enough to threaten these cities.  

Initially, main effort will be to take Chasiv Yar. Based on experience in Bakhmut and Avdiivka this operation will require the commitment of a force of about 30-50,000 soldiers for about 3-6 months. Chasiv Yar is vital because it sits within high ground that dominates the H20 highway.  Russia needs to control this highway because the Sviaty Hory National Park blocks an advance on Sloviansk from Kremina or Lyman. Likewise using the E40/M03 motorway from Krasna Hora as a main supply route requires securing two defiles (choke points created by terrain, marked with black crosses on the map below) before it can be used to supply an advance on the objective. If Chasiv Yar is under Russian control using the H20 becomes an option. It is a longer route but may be easier to advance along because of the more open nature of the terrain it crosses. 

Concurrently, Russia will push south from Kremina toward Siversk (into the cross hatched area on the map below) and possibly east towards Lyman. By advancing toward Siversk and then advancing south along the Bakhmutka River (shown in blue on the map below) Russia can cut the Ukrainian salient north/south and ‘bite off the tip.’   A relatively easy territorial gain but of limited operational value because the terrain between the Bakhmutka River and the objective is rough and has no major roads.  

In summary, even though the current focus is Chaisv Yar and Siversk, Russia has bigger plans.  The question is how far can Russia realistically push in the summer.  At this stage we do not know and our first indication will be how long Ukraine can hold Chasiv Yar, or if there is a sudden Ukrainian collapse elsewhere. To date this seems unlikely, but the situation could change rapidly depending on whether Ukraine’s ammunition shortages are as bad as reported.  

An attack on Kharkiv? 

But Sergei Lavrov’s statement is very interesting, as I have outlined above Russia is developing a sensible and potentially achievable operation that threatens Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.  My assessment is that with current resources, Russia could capture Chasiv Yar and the tip of the salient east of the Bakhmutka River this summer, before European and American aid arrives.  This would bring Kramatorsk in range of tube artillery and Sloviansk in range of rocket artillery allowing Russia to maintain constant artillery harassment of these cities. Russia would then be ready to secure a main supply route to Sloviansk and Kramatorsk along either the E40/M03 or H20 motorways in the Winter and by summer 2025, with two annual conscription cycles complete, Russia could be poised ready with a force large enough to realistically threaten these cities. 

Even with US aid arriving this plan is probably achievable, given Ukraine’s focus on development of its defensive lines and preparation for transition to offensive operations will require it to give ground at times.  But, Lavrov’s statement changes this assessment.  He is an experienced and clever diplomat so is unlikely to have spoken out of turn, meaning that the statement confirms Russian intent to attack towards Kharkiv.

If Russia tries to take Kharkiv this summer, the plan outlined above becomes less sustainable and more likely to fail. A Russian attack on Kharkiv is likely to fail and will impact on operations in the east.  Russia has already failed to take Kharkiv and simply does not have the resources to try again without sacrificing a potentially successful operation in the east.  This decision is probably politically motivated and will only draw resources away from attacking Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.  

Summary

This week’s key takeaway is that Russia’s time to bend the ‘inflexion curve’ in their favour is gone. Russia has not been able to capitalise on the uncertainty created by debate over US aid and deliver a key victory, confirming the messages of its disinformation campaign.  A victory that would potentially influence Western decision-makers to withdraw support. 

Instead, in recent weeks Russia has only been able to achieve ‘positional’ gains along a largely static frontline. Specifically, even in important areas like Chasiv Yar, that has faced glide bombs, elite VDV units and large armoured attacks, Ukraine still holds firm.  Now, with a sensible plan developing in the east Putin has difficulty matching his ambition with his capability and now appears keen to open another axis of attack.  An option, that in my opinion, will only dissipate Russian resources and undermine his opportunity to achieve short-term gains.  

Next week, President Biden will sign off $60 billion of aid. The European Community is providing aid, 4.5 billion euros in March, searching the world for air defence missiles and ammunition and is re-opening ammunition factories.  Aid will not arrive immediately and we should expect to see Russia attack aggressively in the next few weeks. It is also likely there will be more nuclear rhetoric and statements about how the US and Europe are fighting an existential war against Russia. Longer-term, it seems likely that Putin’s reticence about mass conscription will disappear because his biggest advantage is numbers.  

It seems likely that Ukraine will hold on, finish its new defensive lines and slowly rebuild an army capable of taking back territory.  Meanwhile Putin seems to believe his own propaganda. His disinformation campaigns have had some big wins in recent years and he was probably banking on the US aid bill failing in Congress. But courage and reason prevailed and America continues to support both Ukraine and more importantly the international rules-based order.  

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack